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DEATH OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE’S ARMY AND
THE WARS OF SUCCESSION
Robert Niebuhr







The death of Yugoslavia took place in tandem with the death of the Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA). Initially, the JNA sought to maintain the integrity of the federation but soon unraveled
along ethnic lines. The JNA’s internal transition thus serves as a microcosm of the process of
Yugoslav dismemberment. On a personal level, soldiers with mixed ethnicities had to choose
allegiances. That struggle mirrored certain choices by civilians, but on a much more troubling
level—namely, who to shoot at and why? Finally, no discussion of the breakup of Yugoslavia
can go without mentioning the role of the League of Communists. The relationship between
the army, party, and state helped create fissures and further confusion, especially with the
fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. How could a party-run army and
state peacefully transition to some form of a multi-party state and mixed economy? The
troubles that plagued former Yugoslavia and the JNA, especially during the 1980s, created
a mixture that helped foster disaster and death at all levels.
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Since Tito’s death in 1980, the country has been plagued by worsening political
rivalries between Serbia and the more prosperous Croatia and Slovenia.1
Estimates are that the political situation in the army is good and stable because
success is guaranteed through the army’s role and work in defense which benefits
the independence of the entire territory and constitution of the SFRY.2
The death of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) began in 1991, when the Socialist
Republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and seceded. Shortly after
these actions the republics of Macedonia and Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) followed
suit. The ensuing armed struggle initially to “save the federation” became so intense
that it destroyed the notion of Yugoslavia for many people, including its army.
The dissolution of former Yugoslavia into ethnic republics wreaked havoc on the
army and forced serious reorganization of the defense industries. During the Cold
War, the Yugoslav armed forces had deliberately spread their men and materiel
throughout the country in accord with a decentralized territorial defense paradigm.
During the wars of succession, the JNA dissolved along ethnic lines, and in certain
circumstances formed and legitimized paramilitary forces. War disrupted the
continued procurement of resources by the JNA because the armaments factories,
industry, and depots were located all over former Yugoslavia. The loss of certain
factories and warehouses seriously handicapped the JNA’s fighting capacity, although
the JNA was still remarkably well-equipped and supplied, compared with the initial
fighting forces of the breakaway republics.
Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the JNA was renamed the Army of Yugoslavia
(Vojska Jugoslavije, VJ) on May 21, 1992. The Republics of Serbia and Montenegro held
on to the same name of Yugoslavia for their union until 2002, when their names
officially changed to Serbia and Montenegro (SiCG). The name of the army was also
altered to account for this change (Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore or VSCG).
While Slovenia confronted and defeated the JNA with its special police and
territorial defense units, Croatia required the establishment of a broader armed
force to meet the more determined JNA resolve there. Named the Hrvatska Vojska
(HV), the Croatian Army fought the JNA and VJ until 1995, when the wars of secession
paused in the wake of the U.S.-mediated Dayton accords.3
1 Stephen Engelberg, “Yugoslav Factions Trade Blame for Deaths in Clash”, New York Times
(May 4, 1991): 5.
2 Milana Daljeviæa, “Situacija u Armiji dobra i stabilna”, Borba (March 25, 1983). “Ocijenjeno je
da je politièka situacija u armiji dobra i stabilna, što je garanci ja da uspješno ostvaruje ulogu
i zadatke u obrani nezavisnosti i teritorijalne cjelokupnosti i ustavnog poretka SFRJ”.
3 The politics surrounding the JNA and later VJ participation in the wars of succession are
murky at best. To satisfy legal impositions according to international law following the
recognition of Croatia and Bosnia as sovereign nations, a separate Serbian army was created
– the Vojska Republike Srpske Krajine, VRSK (The Army of the Serbian Krajina). This force
benefited from not only the wealth of materiel left behind from the JNA, but also from the
personnel ties as well. However, the level of direct wartime links remains a sensitive issue. It
has been argued that the JNA and later VJ served to not only re-equip the VRSK, but trained
soldiers and supplied reinforcements.
27niebuhr.pmd 2/8/2005, 2:55 AM92
Robert Niebuhr: Death of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Wars of Succession
93
One important aspect of the wars of secession was the role of the successor armies.
The domination by Serbs of the officer corps remained throughout the entire life
of the JNA, including the period of Yugoslav collapse. The fact that all the non-Serb
republics except Macedonia created independent armies and immediately sent them
into combat is highly significant. The JNA naturally suffered from the loss of officers
who were either purged or left to join the other republican armies on their own,
but this also left the successor armies desperate for adequate manpower. While
certainly in the best position throughout the conflicts, the JNA fighting for Serbia
also suffered from desertions, mutinies, draft-dodging, and casualties that strained
its ability to be effective in the field. Due to legal technicalities Jane’s Intelligence
Review noted that, “out of a total of 70,000 draftees the YPA [JNA] had in 1990,
some 25,000 had deserted or left the service”.4
This fact is striking when it is realized that the republics successfully achieved
their goals after prolonged armed conflict. The initial disposition of the JNA
gave them clear advantages. The non-commissioned officer corps (NCO) remained
squarely in the hands of ethnic Serbs, which made the victory against Serbian
armies even more remarkable. In combat, the non-commissioned officers possess
direct control over soldiers and exhibit a great deal of influence regarding the
actual combat readiness of an army. The NCOs fight alongside their soldiers
and make the vital combat decisions, so the lack of NCOs of Croatian or Bosnian-
Muslim heritage gave advantages to the Serbian armies.
The disintegration of the JNA and the formation of republican armies reveal
a great deal about the status of the Yugoslav army in 1990-1991. As long as the
Communist Party ruled, the army could not stand alone as the final authority
within Yugoslavia without clear political direction. That political direction was
sorely lacking and the army found itself in the middle of a political vacuum and
eventually found itself fighting for a corrupt political regime under Miloševiæ.
 The dismantling of Yugoslavia took some time to complete, but the
disintegration began immediately following the recognition by Serbia’s leader,
Slobodan Miloševiæ, of Slovene independence in June 1991. The JNA fought a
limited effort to hold Slovenia, but eventually withdrew after sustaining minor
losses and at the behest of Miloševiæ. During the short battle for Slovenia, the
commander in charge of the JNA was a Slovene, General Konrad Kolsek. Despite
his ethnicity, he vowed to maintain the Yugoslav nation and quell Slovenian
independence. Kolsek proclaimed, “We will act in accordance with the rules of
combat. All resistance will be crushed”.5 Kolsek was clearly fighting a Yugoslav
war and this represents the lack of clear path among elites in Yugoslavia in the
4 See “Yugoslav Ground Forces”, Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 1, 1993), http://
www.janes.com. Regarding mass surrender, “In one of the most humiliating episodes for the
YPA [JNA], almost the entire 32nd Corps in Varazdin surrendered to Croatian forces in October
1991. The Croatian fortunes were considerably boosted because 150-185 tanks and armoured
vehicles and large quantities of ammunition fell into their hands as a result”.
5 Kolsek quoted in Chuck Sudetic, “Face-Off Across a Road’s White Line”, New York Times
(June 28, 1991): A10.
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months prior to Miloševiæ’s consolidation of effective control. Regarding Miloševiæ’s
goals in the ensuing conflict in former Yugoslavia, most scholars argue that he
desired a greater Serb state after realizing that the SFRY was going to disintegrate.
The recognition of Slovenia was not a problem for Miloševiæ because it fell outside
the scope of any potential greater-Serbian state. However, a large number of Serbs
lived in Croatia and Bosnia. According to most scholars, in the effort to secure
those Serbian-populated lands Miloševiæ was inevitably drawn into a conflict that
was motivated by ethnicity, specifically a greater Serbia.6 By making such claims,
Miloševiæ helped to bring the SFRY to the brink and to unravel the federation.
The battle for Slovenia represented the last multi-ethnic act of the JNA. Captain
Nevin Sojiæ of the Slovenian Territorial Defense noted: “There are guys in their [JNA]
unit from all over the country, including a Slovene or two, and even an Albanian”.7
One important element of the army’s operation in Slovenian was the ethnic
composition of the officer corps in Slovenia and Croatia, which was part of the
Fifth Military District. In July 1991, the officer corps there consisted of 57 percent
Serbs, 12 percent Croats, 6 percent Slovenes, 5 percent Montenegrins, 4 percent
Yugoslavs, and 16 percent other nationalities.8 Surely, the predominantly Serbian
ethnic composition of the officer corps stationed in Slovenia and Croatia would
guarantee regime loyalty. Furthermore, in August 1990 it was reported that the
police in Croatia was 67 percent ethnically Serbian.9 The short battle for Slovenia
spelled the end for Yugoslavia and its army by giving legitimacy to republican rights
and making the right to secession a legal reality. During the fighting, Milan Kuèan,
the Slovene President, called for Slovene desertion from the JNA in the wake of the
attempted occupation, which he characterized as “aggression against the sovereignty
of the country”.10
Many newspapers articles throughout the world saw the dilemma the multi-
ethnic country faced in this breakup. One story, by the New York Times journalist
David Binder, describes how a Serbian officer dealt with the predicament within his
family as he flew an air-combat mission over Croatia:
The pilot’s Croatian wife had called him from Zagreb demanding that he take
off his uniform and desert, or she would jump from their 14th-story apartment
with their child. The pilot then called his Serbian mother in Novi Sad, who
6 See Ozren >unec, Rat i društvo ogledi iz sociologije vojske i rata (Zagreb: naklada Jesenski i
Turk, 1998): 110, and Danko Plevnik, Rat i mir za Hrvatsku: Zapisi 1991.-1995. (Zagreb:
Naklada zavod Matice Hrvatske, 2002): 226. Both discuss the ideas of the “Greater Serbia”
project as a modern concept and the means of Miloševiæ’s rise to power through the “anti-
bureaucratic revolution” respectively.
7 Nevin Sojiæ in Sudetic, “Face-Off Across a Road’s White Line”, A10.
8 Davor Marijan, Smrt oklopne brigade: Prilozi za istra<ivanje rata za Hrvatsku i Bosnu i
Hercegovinu 1990.-1992 (Zagreb-Sarajevo: Naklada ZORO, 2002): 212.
9 Milan Vego, “The Croatian Army”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, http://www.janes.com.
10 Kuèan in John Tagliabue, “Yugoslavia Battles Breakaway Republic”, New York Times (June 28,
1991): A10.
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told him that if he took off the uniform of the Yugoslav Army, he could
never cross her threshold again. He flew that night.11
JNA Colonel Ivan Matoviæ described the pain that many of the army families
were having during the breakdown of the federation: families felt unable to
even “defend themselves” much less their nation.12
Military analysts had assumed for years that the multi-ethnic composition of
the JNA would impede internal conflict. Nevertheless, military professionals noted
how the JNA seemed to have its hands tied during the period of dissolution.
Some saw the JNA as bluffing military control or the imposition of martial law
since, as one New York Times reporter noted, “the troops are conscripted from
all regions of the country and cannot necessarily be counted on to follow the
largely Serbian officer corps in battle against fellow Yugoslavs”.13 However, some
observers noted that martial law and revitalized JNA authority might have been
a reality for Yugoslavia if certain generals had had their way.14
One thing that kept the Slovene independence movement alive was its high
spirits in the face of destruction. When interviewed, a Slovenian militiaman
guarding the border remarked on the Slovene resolve: “They are strongest at
the moment. We are trying to hold what is ours, not to take anything. This
land is ours”.15 Slovenes, by and large, described the JNA battle for Slovenia as
an act of occupation and not a civil war. Furthermore, Slovenes believed that
they were, “defending Slovenian independence” and the West had known of
how the JNA handled operations, it would not support Yugoslav territorial
integrity.16
11 David Binder, “Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia Tearing Apart Its Army, Too”, New York Times
(October 1, 1991): A1.
12 Matoviæ in Binder, “Ethnic Conflict”, A1.
13 Stephen Engelberg, “Yugoslav Forges Ethnic Peace Plan”, New York Times (May 10, 1991):
A3.
14 See “Watch the Yugoslav Generals”, Jane’s Foreign Report (February 5, 1991), http://
www.janes.com. “These generals and admirals may be itching for the right moment, while
the world’s attention is on the Gulf war, to declare martial law and seize power. Their frame of
mind was revealed in a secret “topical brief” prepared by the army’s political directorate and
read out to selected groups of officers on January 24th. It noted that, in spite of the efforts of
“western anti-socialist strategists”, socialism had not yet been defeated in any of the countries
where the revolution had been home-grown and not imported (Yugoslavia, for instance). It
welcomed the “ever more resolute action” by the Soviet army to counter separatism. In
Yugoslavia, it said, western attacks were concentrated on the communists still in power (like
Milosevic). The main task, therefore, was for the ruling communists to become the “main
political force” in the country”.
15 Stephen Kinzer, “In Slovenian Villages, a Fierce Determination but a Shortage of Firepower”,
New York Times (June 29, 1991): 4.
16 Chuck Sudetic, “Despite Their Setbacks, Slovenes Remain Defiant”, New York Times (June 30,
1991): 8.
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The strength of the Slovene resolve to gain independence was not necessarily a
recent phenomenon in Yugoslavia. Namely, sentiment that ranged from poor
enthusiasm and ambivalence towards the regime to outright desires for
dismemberment with independence had a considerable history in Yugoslavia. Stipe
Šuvar, a high-ranking member of the Croatian League of Communists, and former
Sociology professor at the University of Zagreb, commented that the frustrations in
former Yugoslavia had larger meanings. The initial wave of Communist success
following the Second World War in bringing people together and dispelling prior
differences simply had fallen victim to time:
After having been drunk on ideology, which was destroying everything that
was old and which promised the rapid creation of happiness on earth; after
having become disappointed by the results of such a radical ideology, people
have started sobering up and trying to return to the old, lost values: the religious
and ethnic communities.17
While this referred to the Croatian autonomy movement in the 1970s, it represents
the dissatisfaction that leaders of Yugoslavia tried desperately to combat. Such
complaints grew over time for many reasons, including the economic conditions
and ethnic tensions. The regime possessed many adherents, but the forces of dissent
grew with time.
As the historian James Gow argues, Tito stood at the center of the SFRY and
wielded his personal authority: his “diffuse system left nobody with enough power
or authority to act decisively and had nobody who could be responsible for crisis,
chaos, and the lack of an adequate political response”.18 While a single person did
not succeed Tito, many saw the armed forces as the custodian of the revolution
and guarantor of the state, as was manifest in the changing nature of civil-military
politics. As Tito lay on his deathbed in 1980, the government discussed plans for the
armed forces assuming a posture of military preparedness.19 When Tito drafted the
last Yugoslav constitution in 1974, he had deliberately made the federal president a
rotating position, based on a consensus voting system. Tito’s system failed to weather
the storms that followed his death in 1980. Perhaps any country, conditioned to
dictatorial rule, finds succession difficult apart from normal economic, political, and
social problems. The difficulties following Tito’s death spelled trouble for the SFRY
and forced the new system to adapt quickly. Economic stagnation and regression
had left many people worse off than in prior years and with little confidence in a
recovery. When in 1988 Ante Markoviæ became prime minister, his economic austerity
program drew little widespread, domestic support and further weakened the
17 Šuvar in Gary Bertsch, Values and Community in Multi-National Yugoslavia (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976): 113.
18 Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992): 7.
19 John Darnton, “Yugoslav Military Alerted as Tito’s Condition Worsens”, New York Times
(February 14, 1980): A10.
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regime.20 The historian Robert Hayden contends that force was necessary once the
constitution broke down in 1990:
Each of these republics began increasingly to ignore federal authority and to
veto federal activity. With the erosion of federal authority, the “combative
federalism” that had [been] obtained since 1974 was transformed into a series
of grim zero-sum games, in which each republic sought its own momentary
tactical advantage without any recognition of the benefits of cooperation.21
What happened during the late 1980s and early 1990s? While the army had
been drawn into politics by none other than Tito himself in the 1970s, its political
role continued until it became the most significant post-Titoist embodiment of the
Yugoslav federation and disdained all separatism. The nationalist politics practiced
in Croatia and Serbia, as well as the separatism in Slovenia undermined the role of
the army in Yugoslavia. The army had enjoyed the patronage of Tito, who recognized
it as supporting the regime against anti-Yugoslav change. Following Tito’s death,
the army was forced into the position of supreme guarantor without any popular
pan-Yugoslav civilian base of support. The 1980s witnessed a loss of support for the
Communist Party throughout Eastern Europe. In the wake of the Second World
War the Party was filled by members of the former Partisan army, but that
demographic base could not be sustained. By 1945, when the Party had 140,000
members, a reasonable fear of militarization of the Party emerged.22 While the
army-party ties remained strong, the Party looked outside of the soldier’s realm to
realize legitimacy and succeeded for many years. Importantly, the officer corps
participated greatly within the LCY and the two institutions grew interconnected.23
That interconnectedness helped to spell disaster for both institutions and by extension
for the entire Yugoslav idea.
One way to help understand the civil-military relationship is the tie between the
army and the party. The two were under the command of Tito during the Second
World War, and stood for national liberation. The explicit goal of the fighting forces
was to secure a new state and a new system through the liberation of the country
from the Axis forces. Furthermore, Tito had secured his victory popularly and sought
to maintain it. The maintenance of popularity remains one explanation for the
Yugoslav system changing to fit the different times. Change was one characteristic
favorably attributed to the Yugoslav system as it remained outside of Moscow’s
paternalistic grip. Valerie Bunce has argued that such popular support explains one
reason why Yugoslavia also died in the violent manner that it did. While it is logical
to assume that popular support would afford the regime freedom of movement,
20 Elez Biberaj, “Yugoslavia: A Continuing Crisis?” Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism 225 (October 1989): 5.
21 Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav
Conflicts (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999): 48.
22 A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch, (San
Diego, CA: RAND, 1978): 3.
23 Gow, Legitimacy, 141.
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just the opposite was true because the state had to cater to its relatively politi-
cized populace for fear of losing support and creating mini-Tito’s, republican
leaders who could wield local support and affect change.24 This created a
situation in which the state needed the party as much as the party needed the
army.
The army recognized that problems of nationalism and liberalism endangered
the army as well as the state. The army recognized the need to adapt to the
changes in Yugoslav politics by allowing for the Territorial Defense and similar
self-management systems. When the military leaders realized that further
decentralization could hinder the federal bonding agents that had kept
Yugoslavia a viable state, the army rebuffed challenges to its institutional
autonomy and sought instead to strengthen the central JNA’s role in the state.25
The army put forward a plan of recentralization called Jedinstvo, which tried
to marginalize and derail the power of the TDFs. The Chief of Staff and later
Yugoslav Defense Minister, Admiral Branko Mamula, commented that “It is
difficult to understand how any reasonable person could conceive of how a
collective high command of 30 people could be anything but problematic after
Tito’s departure especially if met by the JNA and armed defense”.26 The instability
in the country was so worrisome because of the apparent failures of the post-
Tito federal government to contain such challenges. As the military historian Davor
Marijian has noted, “the work of the armed forces, in particular the peaceful part,
was prepared for the energetic and fast containment of all challenges to the
constitutional order of the country and the revelation that to defeat these forces
a special war and military intervention were necessary”.27 The very actions of the
JNA, which had sought to hold the country together and quell internal agitation,
actually served to break apart the country. Military action thus fostered more radical
reactions from those groups seeking reforms in- or outside of Yugoslavia.28
Yugoslav President Borislav Joviæ believed that central control needed to be
strengthened in order to prevent the republics from breaking away. In 1990, he
declared that “violations of the constitution and law have reached such proportions
that they threaten certain vital functions of the state”. He anticipated that “the
coming to power of extreme right-wing and revanchist forces would create great
24 Valerie Bunce in State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945-1992, eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy,
Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997): 347.
25 See Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia, 20.
26 Mamula in Davor Marijan, “’Jedinstvo’ – posljednji ustroj JNA”. Polemos 6:1-2 (January – June
2003): 14.
27 Marijan, “‘Jedinstvo’ – posljednji ustroj JNA”, 34.
28 See, Franjo Tuðman, “All We Croatian Want is Democracy”, New York Times (June 30, 1990):
23. For example, after Franjo Tuðman became president of Croatia he noted that the JNA was
not allowed to disarm Croatian paramilitary units and would be treated as an occupying force
and enemy if it pursued such goals. Also see Franjo Tuðman in Chuck Sudetic, “Yugoslavia
Warns Croatia to Disarm Its Forces”, New York Times (January 22, 1991): A3. “In fact, if
Belgrade does not cause a civil war by military intervention, there will be no civil war”.
However, “If the army goes into action tonight as Mr. Jovic said, it would lead to catastrophic
consequences”.
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difficulties. This could lead to civil war and open the possibility of foreign military
intervention”.29 Military and the political leaders recognized the problems of
decentralization and desperately tried to contain them.
The army-party relationship proved very revealing in this intricate situation. The
LCY organization in the army declared that its basic organizations, forums, and
operatives directed the activity toward the strengthening of ideological and political
awareness and moral and political unity, including the development of the combat
readiness and the revolutionary and popular character of the JNA.30 The members
of the LCY organization in the army were seen to be vital to the health of the state
and its eventual success in economic and political socialist self-management.31 This
organization also sought institutional integrity and compatibility with other aspects
of society, but still took all direction from the LCY organ within the JNA, which
derived its function, character, and mission from the greater LCY.32
There existed numerous reports about the various conferences of the LCY
organization in the army, each describes insights into what the military elites thought
and worried about. In 1971, Tito himself declared that “We must vigilantly watch all
those negative effects on the security, integrity and sovereignty of our country and
our self-managing social system”. He attached much responsibility to the army:
A great responsibility rests with the Communists for the preservation and
strengthening of brotherhood and unity, and equality of the people and
nationalities of our country … The Communists in the Army have always had a
sense of responsibility for the implementation of the fundamental questions
and principles of policy of the LCY, because, as Communists and soldiers, they
have grasped and understood their importance to the future of our community
and its prosperity.33
At the same conference, Colonel Veljko Miladinoviæ, editor of the Party journal
Komunist, emphasized the army’s plans to accept everything that the party deemed
necessary for Yugoslavia: “In this respect, we neither have, nor can have, other
interests, because this also contains our specific objectives, since such solutions secure
the most favorable conditions for an even greater moral strength of the Army”.34
29 Borislav Joviæ in Timothy Heritage, “Yugoslav Leader Calls for New Constitution to Prevent
Civil War”, Reuters (May 28, 1990), http://global.factiva.com/en/arch/print_results.asp
(accessed on October 14, 2003).
30 “League of Communists Organization Within [The] Armed Forces”, Narodna Armija (April 25,
1974): 15-16. Accessed at the Open Society Archives, Budapest (OSA). This same goal was
articulated in many articles, including “Nastavlja se Titovo revolucionarno delo”, Politika
(June 27, 1981).
31 “Armija – pouzdan oslonac radnièke klase”. Borba (December 21, 1982).
32 “League of Communists Organization Within [The] Armed Forces”, Narodna Armija (April 25,
1974): 15-16. OSA.
33 Josip Broz Tito in “Session of the Conference of the LCY in the Yugoslav People’s Army”, Borba
(January 16, 1971): 1. OSA.
34 Veljko Miladinoviæ in “Session of the LC Conference in the YPA”, Borba (January 16, 1971): 5.
OSA.
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Such rhetoric did not change much over the course of the 1970s, when the
army continued to declare that its success and ties to the Party were the very
strength that kept the army morally healthy.35 Such statements indicate the
army’s very real fear about the future viability of the state. Admiral Branko
Mamula stated that the military-political situation in the world was troubling
for Yugoslavia:
In addition, our serious internal difficulties, which are both the consequence
of the above-mentioned international troubles and of our own weaknesses,
are a warning that we have to appraise our international position realistically
… we must especially strengthen our armed forces … Our armed forces
have never been meant exclusively for the protection of the independence
of our country against possible foreign intervention, but they have also at
the same time been the guardian of our socialist system.36
Mamula’s statement reaffirmed Tito’s views of the army to fight internal and external
enemies, but added that Yugoslavia suffered from serious internal difficulties partly
due to our own weaknesses.
In 1979, the political role of the army was increasingly denied. The Slovene
journalist, Primo< •agar, published a serious of articles that chastised observers
in the West who thought that the army was planning to take over leadership
of the country. The apolitical nature of the army was cited along with of the
“recognition” that Yugoslavia was managed by the working class. The masses
managed themselves and were not run by the army but merely protected not
it.37
•agar does not accurately represent the politics of the time. In 1979, in the
166-member LCY Central Committee, there were 23 high-ranking officers or 14
percent of the total membership of 90-100,000 communists in the 250,000-man
JNA. Not only was the defense minister a military officer, but many other leading
offices in Belgrade were staffed by officers. For example, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, the Federal State Attorney, Secretary-General of the SRFY State Presi-
dency, and the Executive Secretary in the Central Committee Presidium were all
35 See B. Popoviæ, “SFRY: Belgrade Army Communists Discuss Ideological Work”, Borba (October
20, 1979): 14. OSA. “’The ideological-political work has directly contributed to strengthening
the military organization, the leadership and command system, the conscious military discipline
and the sense of duty and responsibility.’ This work is an integral part of the entire life and
work of members of the Yugoslav People’s Army and for this reason ‘cannot and must not be
separated from the overall practical work, from the combat training and education, from the
struggle to strengthen the internal work, discipline and responsibility and from the struggle
to form the working and moral character of all members of the Yugoslav People’s Army.’”
36 Mamula in The Role of the Army in Post-Tito Yugoslavia, (Radio Free Europe Research: RAD
Background Report/40, February 11, 1982). OSA.
37 Slobodan Stankoviæ, Yugoslav Paper Denies Army’s Political Role (Radio Free Europe Research:
RAD Background Report, November 12, 1979). OSA.
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army generals in 1979.38 Clearly, army leaders had become so frightened by the
end of Tito’s presidency that they began to take their perceived role in politics
very seriously indeed. The LCY organization in the army was just one of the ways
that the army tried to realize the integrity of the federation. As JNA Colonel Boško
Stojanoviæ, noted:
Communists in the Army have always been in progressive positions in the struggle
for social self-management and for the programs and measurements which
contribute to the position and role of the working classes, as well as the economic,
political, and social stability of society. They are actively participating in the
ideological-political struggle of the LCY and other organizations in defense of
society against nationalism, bourgeious-liberalism, bureaucratic dogmatism and
other agents at work against the ideology and constituents in the LCY. 39
As the politics of the 1980s turned towards plural nationalisms, and witnessed
the important changes in Europe, the Communist Party lost much support among
the population. The formal disbanding of the Communist Party’s monopoly in
Yugoslavia took place on January 22, 1990, when the party leaders recognized the
changes outside of Yugoslavia. Stefan Korosec, the Yugoslav party secretary, admitted
that communism “has no historic future”, and that Yugoslavia needed “to catch up
with the pace of democratic reforms” in Eastern Europe.40 At this very momentous
meeting, the Slovene delegation walked out on the remainder of the party,
commenting on the death of Yugoslavia and the birth of new nations at the
congress.41 While the Serbian delegation also recognized the need to accept the
end of the communist monopoly, they envisioned a slower and more centrist pluralism.
The self-imposed decision to disband the monopoly of the Communist Party also
broke with the constitution, which had guaranteed it such power in Yugoslavia.
38 Stankoviæ, Yugoslav Paper Denies Army’s Political Role. Also see Slobodan Stankoviæ, Changes
in the Yugoslav Army Party Organization, (Radio Free Europe Research: RAD Background
Report/1, January 2, 1979): 1-3. OSA. This report examines the ethnicity of the army officials
in the Central Committee. This report cites 21 high-ranking officers in the Central Committee
of which 8 were Serbs, 5 Croats, 2 Slovenes, 2 Montenegrins, 2 Macedonians, 2 Yugoslavs, 1
Albanian, and 1 Moslem. The report also contents that Serbs and Montenegrins were beginning
to occupy key posts in the LCY organization in the JNA.
39 See Dušan Pejanoviæ, Josip Karavaniæ, Mihajlo Goluboviæ, Ernest Mezga, Boška Stojanoviæ,
Bo<o Šašiæ and Èedo Stankoviæ, Organizacija SKJ u JNA, vol. 2, Razvoj oru<anih snaga SFRJ,
1945-1985, (Beograd: Vojnoizdavaèka i novinski centar, 1986): 286. “Komunisti Armije su
uvijek bili na progresivnim pozicijama borbe za socijalistièko samoupravljanje i za programe
i mjere koji doprinose jaèanju polo<aja i uloge radnièke klase, ekonomskoj, politièkoj i socijalnoj
stabilnosti društva. Oni su aktivno uèestvovali u idejno-politièkoj borbi SKJ i ostalih
organizovanih snaga društva protiv nacionalitièkih, bur<oasko-liberalistièkih, birokratsko
-dogmatskih i drugih shvatanja i postupaka suprotnih ideologiji i stavovima SKJ”.
40 Marlise Simons, “Yugoslav Communists Vote to End Party’s Monopoly”, New York Times
(January 23, 1990): A9.
41 Simons, “Yugoslav Communists Vote”, A9.
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Following this decision, Prime Minister Ante Markoviæ, declared that the Party and
the state were still intertwined, “But the process of disassociating of the two has
begun. If parties have a real chance to take part in free elections, then everything
else is rhetoric”.42
The fact that the army and party stood close together meant that their fates were
linked. The constitution guaranteed the army a role in the state, but that role stood in
jeopardy following the January 1990 decision by the LCY to discontinue its monopoly.
While unquestionably supporting the party in the past, the army now needed to make
its own decision. The withdrawal of LCY monopoly, including its influence within the
JNA, opened the door to unknown consequences. Would true democracy come to
Yugoslavia as a united country? Would a postcommunist trend in Europe be realized in
six post-Yugoslav states? Would the military depoliticize and allow the state to become
a rechtstaat, one based upon law rather than party hegemony?43
Indeed the death knell for the army had been rung but it cannot be pronounced
dead until armed conflict began. Issues of democratization challenged the military’s
traditional political profile and ran contrary to the JNA’s intended purpose. A
democratic or multiparty Yugoslavia meant that the erstwhile Communist generals
would have no place in the new state. The possibility of democratization meant the
LCY losing in any election. The fall from grace of the army as a unifying force in
Yugoslavia meant the end to the careers of thousands of officers. Everything Yugoslav
lost legitimacy in 1990. Even the refashioned Communist Party (renamed the League
of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia in November of 1990) outwardly called
for the maintenance of the status quo and the preservation of the SFRY. Several
prominent retired generals supported this new party, including Mamula, Bunciæ,
Mirkoviæ, and Graèanin, the federal interior minister.44
The army wished to maintain the status quo and keep Yugoslavia united by
clinging to the old party line of brotherhood and unity and by downplaying the
ethnic differences in the Yugoslav state. Wishing to remain an arbiter of power and
a model of representation among the various nationalities, the army pushed itself
into a corner and allowed for little room to disengage from political activity and
step aside as the Yugoslav state changed into a multi-party democracy.
What the army could not combat was the popularity with which nationalist
politics took center stage in two major republics. Both in Croatia and Serbia a
popularized rhetoric that focused on the past and created new ethnic labels after
over 40 years without such labeling became fashionable. Slobodan Miloševiæ stayed
in power far too long apart from the obvious ruinous effects his leadership meted
42 Marlise Simons, “Yugoslavia on the Brink”, New York Times (January 24, 1990): A11.
43 Gow, Legitimacy, 140.
44 Gow, Legitimacy, 140. In fact, it was widely held that the new party was led by the JNA and
such military involvement was resented by certain politicians. The military in fact tried to
resist the death of socialism. See Milan Vego, “The Army of Serbian Krajina”, Jane’s Intelligence
Review (October 1, 1993), http://www.janes.com. “The president of Knin Krajina, Mr. Babic,
had great problems with the “League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia” whose
plan was to preserve ‘socialism’ and the federation. The league was the principal tool of the
army’s top leadership and of Tito’s “Partizans” to preserve political influence”.
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out to Serbia. Franjo Tuðman stayed in office in Croatia by taking politically risky
moves that isolated him and his state from much of Europe. Croats recognized that his
power corrupted his goals becoming dangerous for Croatia. Many Croats still express
the view that if Tuðman had given up power before the HV incursion into Bosnia,
prior to the Dayton Accords, he would have remained a truly great Croatian hero.
To place all responsibility on a leader of a group or nation, denies the agency of
other actors. Tito did exert undue influence over elites in Yugoslavia, but he does
not alone explain why the SFRY remained intact. Nor is it prudent to assume that
Miloševiæ or Tuðman wielded total influence in propagating their policies. Like Tito,
both used their influence as powerful party leaders to control the media, to maintain
their close advisors through nepotism and favoritism, as well as to defeat the
opposition. The references to their influence among the people of Croatia and
Serbia in this paper do not assume that other actors failed to play a role. Mentioning
both leaders assumes that their influence played a role in motivating other similarly-
minded people to assume positions of action. Moreover, their rhetoric played to
certain prejudices, insecurities, and the general ignorance of the populace.45
Notwithstanding the effects within civilian society, were the continued debates
over the role of the army both in the dissolution and any post-war government(s).
The primordialist argument is used by authors who see the Yugoslav conflicts as
steeped in ancient hatreds or the resuscitation of old quarrels among the ethnic
groups. Such an argument is not based on realities that faced communist Yugoslavia
and its successor states. Tensions between the various ethnic groups vis-á-vis  the
parent republics took on a pragmatic character; while sprinklings of ideological
nationalisms raised their heads, such radical behavior must be put into broader
context. Nonetheless, fear of nationalism drove Yugoslav leaders to maintain an
overall balance and accommodate all the people. The Second World War, with all its
divisive civil conflicts and massacres, forced Tito to downplay the past and simply
label wartime victims as “victims of fascism”, and “domestic traitors” instead of blaming
any particular group.46 Such fears also drove army leaders to demand more equitable
national representation in the army during the life of the JNA.47
45 Srdja Pavlovic, “Understanding Balkan Nationalism: The wrong people, in the wrong place, at
the wrong time”. Southeast European Politics 1:2 (December 2000): 122. Pavlovic further
argues that, “I am of the opinion that the insufficient knowledge of that other, poor level of
communication and exchange between the different groups in the region constitute the core
elements of nationalistic fear and hate”. I would go a step further and say that rather than
constituting “the core elements” insufficient knowledge and poor communication and
exchange were symptoms that allowed nationalistic propaganda to flourish. I would argue
that most people lived their lives concerned with their own existence and failed to worry
extensively about other ethnic groups and wrongs committed in the past. When pursued
with half-truths  and lies such people can more easily fall victim to committing  nationalist-
-driven acts.
46 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999): 99.
47 In fact, equitable representation was demanded at “ALL levels”. See “3rd Session of the YPA
Conference at the LCY: Only a Strong Yugoslavia can Define her Independence”, Borba
(November 12, 1971): 6. OSA.
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In contrast, the divisive politics practiced by Miloševiæ involved the reawakening of
ethnic identity and emphasizing Serbia and its unique history. Reburials, such as
that of Tsar Lazar on monastic land, deemed to be Serbia proper, became important.
As the Serb nationalist Vuk Draškoviæ noted, “Serbia is wherever there are Serbian
graves”.48 Thus the religious spirit of Orthodoxy was used for political purposes to
motivate Serbs. The Serbian patriarch even participated in singing liturgy for those
killed in war. Religion thus played a big role in the death of Yugoslavia. The Serbian
Orthodox church took the lead in revitalizing myths, such as the Kosovo myth,
following Tito’s death. The church remained critical of the anti-religious stance of
the LCY, but focused more attention on the Serb abandonment of Kosovo to the
Albanians. Church rhetoric gave the Party more fuel for the nationalist fire.49
According to historian Vesna Pešiæ, “the Yugoslav state lacked the integrative
potential necessary to create institutional frameworks and workable procedures of
democratic rule that could accommodate the problematic relations among its
different national groups”.50 Keeping in line with the hegemonic nature of
communism, Yugoslav communism forcefully attempted to quell ethnic rivalry
purporting that such concepts as ethnic differences would wither away along with
the state. Furthermore, Pavloviæ argues that,
the communist elite in the former Yugoslavia was as nationalistic as their royalist
predecessors had been but the manifestations of their nationalist sentiments
had acquired new ideological frameworks, thus, creating a new form of
nationalism that combined the elements of the old nineteenth century nationalist
thought together with the new ideology of the Yugoslav supranationality.51
The notion of a Yugoslav ethnic identity served the regime with a broader-based
legitimizing notion that could advance the goals of communism. The expression,
“national in form, socialist in content”, allowed the state to express socialist patriotism
in terms of Yugoslav ethnic identity.52 Yet, this idea only helped to further the conflict
when identity became such a bigger issue. Identity for some came to symbolize the
greatest problem facing Yugoslavia. As the Serbian political writer, Mihailo Markoviæ
48 Draškoviæ in Verdery, 98.
49 Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000): 196. In addition to addressing the Kosovo myth, Duijzings chronicles, for example,
the case of the Kosovar Croatian village of Letnica that was prompted by the nationalist
rhetoric of Tuðman to flee Kosovo for Croatia in the early 1990s, despite the fact that their
Catholicism and their community interests were arguably being better served in Kosovo.
Duijzings also points out in his book that particularly during historic moments of violence
patterns of ethnic and confessional identity are most subject to fluctuation.
50 Vesna Pešiæ, Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis (Washington, DC, U.S.
Institute of Peace, 1996): 3.
51 Srdja Pavloviæ, “Understanding Balkan Nationalism: The wrong people, in the wrong place, at
the wrong time”, Southeast European Politics 1:2 (December 2000): 118. Emphasis in original.
52 Pešiæ, 10.
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wrote, “Our problem is not a crisis of ideology; it is a national identity crisis”.53 The
army officer corps stood as a vital institution behind the concept of a Yugoslav
identity. As Gow argues, the middle and junior ranks during 1990 encompassed a
5.4 percent Yugoslav ethnic component. Of that 5.4 percent, most were likely Serbs.
This last point should not color the fact that a “Yugoslav” identity existed within the
officer corps and outnumbered Albanians, Muslims, Slovenes, and others.54 The
role that identity played in the death of the JNA was not insignificant and stands in
line with the kind of ethnic tension within an ethnically-fragmented military. Yet,
the existence of officers who identified so closely with the regime as to consider
their ethnicity Yugoslav under the social constructs of the regime, proves that certain
members of the JNA would go to great lengths to preserve the union.
Throughout the entire process of transition, the Yugoslav succession by means
of armed conflict played a large role in helping to fuel destabilization. Such violence
still stands as a principal reason for the economic, political, and social troubles
currently plaguing Southeastern Europe. With the tremendous increase in size of
its fighting force, the JNA and its successors all used violence to solve problems. The
breakdown of civilian Yugoslav political authority, which legitimized the JNA, helped
to a new, virulent national ideology that embraced military intervention but that
undermined the authority of the JNA. The legacy of this violent separation also
hindered the development of the post-Yugoslav states, whether they experienced
fighting on their territory or not. The death of the JNA began many years prior but
when it finally succumbed it stood as the last remnant of a united Yugoslavia that
itself became caught up in intrigue and chaos. With the army’s fall in Slovenia an
entire ideology fell from grace and no one can speak about a “third” Yugoslavia –
that notion died somewhere along the way.
53 Markoviæ in Marlise Simons, “A Sign of Bad Times in Yugoslavia: Trade War Between Two
Republics”, New York Times, (January 28, 1990): 14.
54 Biberaj, “Yugoslavia...”, 15.
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Smrt Jugoslavije odvijala se istodobno sa smræu Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA). U
poèetku, JNA je <eljela saèuvati integritet Federacije, ali se ova ubrzo raspala po etnièkim
linijama. Promjene koje su se dogodile unutar JNA predstavljaju mikrokozmos procesa
raspada Jugoslavije. Na osobnoj razini, vojnici dvojih nacionalosti trebali su birati kome æe
se prikloniti. Ta unutarnja borba bila je slièna izboru civila ali mnogo slo<enija – u koga
pucati i zašto? Konaèno, raspad Jugoslavije se ne mo<e opisivati bez spominjanja uloge
Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije. Odnosi armije, partije i dr<ave pomogli su u stvaranju dodatne
konfuzije, posebno kad uzmemo u obzir pad komunizma u Sovjetskom Savezu i Istoènoj
Europi. Kako su se partijski voðena armija i dr<ava uopæe mogle na miran naèin transformirati
u neki od moguæih oblika višestranaèkog društva i tr<išne ekonomije? Problemi koji su
pogodili bivšu Jugoslaviju i JNA, posebno tijekom osamdesetih godina 20 stoljeæa, zajedno
su doveli do propasti i smrti na svim društvenim razinama.
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27niebuhr.pmd 2/8/2005, 2:55 AM106
